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THE IOS STORY, OR 
"Do you sincerely want to be rich?" was the question 
Bernie Cornfeld always posed to potential salesmen for 
Investors Overseas Services (IOS) in the 1960s. Since 
Cornfeld, founder and president of the then rapidly 
growing company, rarely received a negative response, 
he had no trouble building an army of IOS salesmen 
that in its heyday reached a total of 76,000. 
Cornfeld actually started with a good idea, to sell 
mutual funds to Americans living overseas and so allow 
them to participate in the U.S. securities market. But his 
version of"people's capitalism" got away from him in 
the bullish atmosphere of the 60s, and by the end of 
the decade he was heading an empire with 250,000 
investors and some $2.3 billion in assets. 
Thus, when the market began to plummet in 1970, 
IOS headquarters in Ferney-Voltaire, France (just across 
the border from Geneva, which had kicked IOS out 
two years earlier) was flooded with requests for 
redemptions. Company management panicked and 
threw Cornfeld out, then looked for a savior whose 
charisma would equal that of their former leader. They 
thought they had such a person in Robert Lee Vesco. 
Their decision marked the beginning of the end for 
IOS, and with the company's slow and painful demise 
came the beginning of what would become the 
longest-running, farthest-reaching liquidation in history. 
Indeed, historians may one day call it the most significant 
international liquidation ever to have taken place. 
i 
THE LIQUIDATION OF A LIVELY 
by J O H N A. ORR/Partner, Toronto 
Before July, 1973, all I knew about IOS 
was what had been in the papers. I 
didn't know that there were four Dol-
lar Funds, so called because sub-
scribers invested their money in U.S. 
dollars. But I was soon to learn a lot 
about all four, and especially the two 
Ontario-based funds, the Fund of 
Funds, Ltd., and IOS Growth Fund, Ltd. 
(also known as Transglobal Growth 
Fund, Ltd.). 
I first got wind of things when a call 
came in from a senior partner of Bor-
den & Elliot, a prominent law firm in 
Toronto. They had become involved in 
the IOS affair and were about to make 
an application to the Ontario court 
requesting the appointment of a liqui-
dator for Fund of Funds (FOF) and IOS 
Growth Fund (Growth). They needed 
a name to submit with their applica-
tion and thought of me. 
I had worked with George Cihra and 
others at Borden & Elliot in previous 
financial matters and receiverships, 
and they were aware of my work as 
financial counsel to justice S. H. S 
Hughes in the Royal Commission on 
Atlantic Acceptance Corporation, ltd. 
And my work was also familiar to the 
courts. But 1 had no idea what I was 
getting into, and the whole thing hap-
pened over the course of one week-
end. I did make it a point to talk to my 
partners at louche Ross, and they 
promised to take some of my work 
load if IOS demanded too much of my 
lime. That was fortunate, since we are 
now in the sixth year of the liquidation 
and the end may not be reached for 
another four years at least. 
It is worth noting that the appoint-
ment of a permanent liquidator is an 
unusual step for a Canadian court. The 
Ontario court was in the process of 
naming 1 he Public trustee of the Prov-
ince of Ontario for the liquidation, 
when Borden & Elliot got involved, on 
behalf of a group of German investors 
in the funds. The investors, for a variety 
of reasons, felt that their interests 
would be better represented by a pri-
vate liquidator than by the public 
trustee. The latter would fall under 
government jurisdiction; the former 
would be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
Section 217 of our Business Cor-
porations Act describes what a tem-
porary liquidator shall do under the 
appropriate circumstances, but it 
doesn't even mention a permanent 
liquidator. However, Justice Lloyd 
Houlden of the Supreme Court of 
Ontario considered that it was impor-
tant to include this wording because of 
all the confusion and counterclaims 
surrounding the funds. Permanent 
meant that 1 was an officer of the 
court, subject to the rules of the Su-
preme Court of Ontario. The title had a 
solid, no-nonsense ring to it. 
The reason for Canada's sudden in-
terest in the remains of IOS was, in 
part, one of embarrassment. For years, 
FOF and Growth had operated freely 
from Ontario. But since their activities 
look place outside Canada, they didn't 
have to report anything to the Ontario 
Securities Commission. Indeed, the 
Ontario location appeared promi-
nently in each fund's prospectus, add-
ing an air of credibility that (he facts 
did not warrant. 
So when the Securities and Ex-
change Commission of the U.S. re-
leased its explosive report on Robert 
Vesco's takeover and plunder of the 
IOS funds in the fall of 1972, Canadians 
began to ask themselves what had 
gone wrong. Since then, our govern-
ment has taken an active and con-
cerned interest in the goings-on of all 
lOS-related companies in Canada. 
As permanent liquidator, my assign-
ment was to: 
— Protect the remaining assets of FOF 
and Growth, 
— Ascertain the identity and entitle-
ment of creditors and investors and 
their claims, 
— Distribute the remaining assets ac-
cording to the above. 
Before any of these things could be 
done, I had to find the assets and 
establish my competency to claim 
them on behalf of the shareholders. 
Finding the assets is a fairly standard 
part of a liquidator's job. You establish 
opening balances and then ask your-
self some questions; a) What does this 
company say that it |wns? b) Where is 
it, so I can put a claim on it? c) And this 
is the tricky part, if it exists, why do I 
gel it and not someone else? Will 
people accept my order to transfer it 
to me as liquidator? 
What made the IOS assignment so 
unique was, first, the diversity of the 
assets, the investments themselves. 
Some were restricted securities, some 
were traded securities. All had been 
set up in such a way as to ensure that 
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the shareholders of the funds avoided 
paying taxes. That had been a plus for 
shareholders bark in the 60s but 
worked against us now, since we had 
to deal with a plethora of regulatory 
authorities in trying to establish our 
competency. 
Establishing competency is primarily 
a legal mailer, arid so partner Alan 
Moreton, myself, and others at louche 
Ross have worked as a team with 
members of Borden & Elliot, principal-
ly George Cihra, Reno Stradiotto, and 
John Warren. Because of the multi-
plicity of jurisdictions and (he legal 
ramifications, we have relied on legal 
counsel far more than in a "normal" 
liquidation. Unlike the U.S., which 
usually names a lawyer as liquidator, in 
Canada we appoint a Chartered Ac-
countant for (his kind of job, so legal 
counsel has been necessary from day 
one. 
However, we found 1 hat even the 
recognition of our competency was 
not enough to guarantee us access to 
fund money. IOS was different from 
other liquidations, in the second place, 
because a lot of people were laying 
claim to the same assets.. and still are. 
So even when we located funds, and 
were recognized as having a legitimate 
claim to them, other people were 
making similar and seemingly legiti-
mate claims on the same assets. Not 
only Vesco and his cohorts, but also 
the liquidators and receivers for the 
other Dollar Funds and IOS, Ltd. Plus,J 
lot of counterclaims by various regula-
tory authorities and shareholder 
groups, each seeking to represent the 
interests of all IOS shareholders. 
Our situation may be depicted as 
that of a surgical team trying to do an 
autopsy on a corpse—except that the 
corpse keeps jumping off the table, 
trying to take the instruments right out 
of the doctor's hands. 
I was blissfully unaware of what lay 
ahead—the size of the case, the peo-
ple-oriented problems, the time and 
travel demands—when my appoint-
ment became official on August 1, 
1973. My preparation had consisted of 
reading everything I could get my 
hands on: affidavits, the SEC-Vesco 
complaint, the book about Cornfeld, 
Do You Sincerely Want to Be Rich? 
I hen our team met, and we decided 
the first thing to do was to go and find 
some money. I he court had appointed 
a liquidator, but it was up to the liqui-
dator to find enough money to carry 
out the liquidation. Until we did so, 
everything was being financed out of 
our own pockets. 
We knew from preliminary reading 
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that there was fund money, a lot of it, at 
the Bank of Montreal. We were a little 
naive to think that we could take a 
briefcase there and be recognized as a 
nice honest liquidator and that the 
bank would then hand us $50-60 mil-
lion. Let's say that that trip added to 
our knowledge of what lay ahead. We 
realized, firs! of all, that cooperation 
with the other Dollar Funds was es-
sential. Secondly, we saw that some 
kind of accord would have to be 
reached with the SEC. 
(he SEC had been following the 
fortunes of IOS since the mid-60s, and 
had done an excellent research job in 
pulling together their report on the 
company in 1972. Moreover, they had 
been through a trying period of deal-
ing with people in high places who 
Were trying to influence them and get 
them off the case, Vesco's 5200,000 
unreported donation to the Commit-
tee to Re-Elect the President was the 
most notorious example. 
Besides, for years the SEC has had a 
policy of policing companies which do 
business in the U.S., regardless of the 
country of origin. Although only 200 
Americans in the U.S. bought shares in 
IOS, many Americans overseas were, 
hurl, and the SEC felt that it was the 
one body with enough power to pull 
together all the disparate pieces of the 
IOS puzzle. So they had been fighting 
for a U.S.-appointed receiver to lake 
over the assets of IOS, wherever they 
might be. Along comes a Canadian 
liquidator following on work they'd 
already done, and it's easy to see why 
with this in mind, I hey were cross. 
How upset they were became ap-
parent when we went to New York for 
a meeting in September, 1973, a month 
after my appointment. We were plan-
ning to meet with some former IOS 
officers who had some useful data, but 
counsel who had acted for IOS ar-
ranged a meeting to introduce me to 
Judge Charles E. Stewart, jr., who was 
presiding over the SEC suit in New 
York. At the same time and unknown 
to me, counsel also informed the SEC 
that I was to meet with Judge Stewart 
concerning my role as permanent 
liquidator. All of a sudden, we were 
in a meeting with fudge Stewart and 
several SEC lawyers who were in 
telephone communication with Wash-
ington. 
After some tense interchange I said, 
"Listen, I'm here to say hello, so that 
you can see what the Canadian liqui-
dator looks like. But we aren't about to 
argue over who is a receiver and who 
isn't, and we don't wish to pursue that 
discussion at this time." At which point 
judge Stewart asked if I am related to 
the hockey player Bobby Orr, and the 
meeting broke up. 
It was clear then that we would have 
to work with the SEC, or we'd wind up 
fighting each other and Vesco would 
benefit. But it took six months of re-
drafting before we worked up an 
agreement acceptable to the SEC and 
to ourselves. That document, called a 
consent order, stipulates that 1 must 
keep judge Stewart and the SEC in-
formed of my progress, and that I may 
accept rulings from Stewart. Bui in the 
case of conflicting orders, my final 
judgment will come from justice 
Houlden of the Ontario court. 
Since the signing of the consent 
order, we have had excellent working 
relations with the SEC, But for those 
first six months, the going was tough. 
Meanwhile* we had been on 30 or 
more fact-finding missions to Europe 
and the Caribbean—still subsidized by 
our own money—over a three-month 
period. Now, some big figures began 
to be bandied about, and I realized 
that the collection and distribution of a 
possible $100 million was going to take 
a lot longer than I'd thought. 
My next step was to attend a meet-
ing of the regulatory bodies which had 
first got together six months earlier. 
This group, which came to be known 
as the International Regulatory Com-
mittee (also known as the Regulatory 
Authority Croup), consisted of repre-
sentatives of the Ontario Securities 
Commission, the Quebec Securities 
Commission, the SEC, the Luxem-
bourg Banking Commissioner, judge 
Weber who was presiding over IOS-
related matters in Switzerland; and all 
liquidators and receivers who had 
been appointed up to that time. I his 
was our first exposure to the diplo-
macy necessary in a multinational en-
vironment among people with com-
peting jurisdictions and interests. 
We saw, first, that liquidators for the 
two remaining Dollar Funds—Interna-
tional Investment Trust (JIT), domi-
ciled in Luxembourg, and Venture 
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Fund N.V., domiciled in C u r a c a o -
needed to be appointed before the 
Bank of Montreal would consider re-
leasing the IOS assets it held. Eventu-
ally; they were appointed, and from 
then on we worked together in relative 
harmony. We fried to track down fund 
money and apportion it equitably 
among the Dollar Funds and, through 
a combined administrative vehicle, 
pay dividends to actual investors in the 
funds. 
White this was going on, we heard 
about some assets that might be ob-
tained in Panama. A company called 
Dominion Guaranty had been formed 
there by a group of IOS salesmen in 
the Cornfeld era, probably as a sort of 
payoff. Actually, Dominion was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of FOF Pro-
prietary Funds, Ltd. (Prop), which in 
turn was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
FOF 
Since most of the assets of FOF were 
held in the name of Prop, it was im-
portant that FOF's liquidator gain con-
trol of Prop The latter, after all, was 
neither in liquidation nor bankruptcy. 
As liquidator of FOF, I held all shares of 
Prop, so we formed a new board 
which elected me president of Prop, 
Having laid this groundwork, we were 
in good shape to take over Dominion 
Guaranty and its assets of some three-
quarters of a million dollars. 
We flew down to Panama and took 
over Dominion much as we had taken 
over Prop. Since our Panamanian 
counsel didn't like the idea of one man 
taking over the company, we signed 
the final papers in our Panama office, 
not his. Then we learned that the 
remaining assets of Dominion were in 
London, not Panama. So we took our 
documents, all beautifully bound in 
blue ribbon, and flew to London. 
The bank manager to whom we 
presented ourselves was impressed by 
neither documents nor ribbons. He 
insisted on an indemnification against 
any suit that might be brought against 
him within 30 days for releasing the 
money. So George Cihra dictated such 
a memo to a secretary at the same 
time thai the banker was sweating and 
signing. 
Then we had the $750,000 trans-
ferred to an Ontario bank. This was 
Our first real milestone—finding a kitty 
from which to operate. Our accom-
plishment was well-timed, for in the 
same period of September-October 
1973, we began to feel the first coun-
termoves by Vesco and his principal 
associate, Canadian-born accountant 
Norman LeBlanc. 
I he Vesco interests brought an ac-
tion in the Bahama courts, whereby 
they pressed for the appointment of a 
liquidator for IOS Program Ltd. They 
claimed that Program was an inter-
mediary between the shareholders 
and the liquidators of the four funds. 
Presumably the liquidators of FOF, 
Growth, IIT, and Venture should col-
lect all the assets and turn them over to 
Program's liquidator, who would then 
distribute them in the best interests of 
the shareholders. 
the Bahamas were friendly territory 
for Vesco, and the result of his actions 
was an injunction by the Bahamian 
court, effectively freezing all IOS 
assets in the Bahamas for a number of 
months. We knew that the Bahamas 
Commonwealth Bank (BCB) was a 
vehicle through which significant sums 
of IOS money flowed, and we also 
knew that there was about $5 million 
in another sub-depository bank there. 
We immediately began work ing 
through legal counsel to get the in-
junction lilted. 
In February, 1974,1 was in the Baha-
mas for meetings, but planned to leave 
after a day to join my family in Florida. 
One of the IIT liquidators begged me 
to stay over. I did so, reluctantly, and 
the very next day the injunction was 
lifted. It was lifted for only two days, 
but that was enough time for me to 
present my credentials and remove 
$5.6 million. If I hadn't stayed over to 
help the liquidator of IIT, who knows 
how long it might have taken to get 
that money. 
Meanwhile, I had received my ex-
emplification in Luxembourg (i.e., was 
recognized as being who I said I was), 
and it seemed like a straightfoward 
matter to present credentials at the 
two sub-depository banks we knew 
about and take our money. But when 
we got to the banks, we were told that 
while our credentials were well and 
good, their customer was Overseas 
Development Bank Luxembourg 
(ODBL). ODBL had been part of a 
banking network set up by the Vesco 
group to loot the funds, and ODBL 
had in (urn sub-deposited funds in 
other banks. 
So we went to O D S L and asked for 
an assignment to pay. At first, they 
brought up the problem of exemplifi-
cation. When that was resolved, the 
question came up of whether ODBL 
was solvent or not. A commissioner 
was appointed to check the bank's 
solvency, and he decided that it had to 
be put into controlled management. 
Three new commissioners were ap-
pointed to that task. 
Their review took months. They 
reached the conclusion that if all the 
Dollar Funds were to be paid out 
dollar for dollar, O D B L would be 
bankrupt and the mess would take 
years to clean up. they suggested 
drafting a plan whereby the bank 
might stay solvent, even by a dollar's 
worth, and an orderly liquidation 
might occur. So we got together with 
the commissioners and the other fund 
liquidators and worked out a plan. 
Then that plan was circulated to the 
creditors of O D B L , approved, and 
brought before the Luxembourg 
courts, which accepted it. 
At that point, we again went to 
Luxembourg to pick up the money. 
Our problem this time was that no one 
wanted to take the check when we 
tried to redeposit it in some other 
bank. For political reasons, we needed 
to leave the money in Luxembourg; 
but every day that we walked around 
the city with $4.5 million in our pock-
ets, it was costing the fund sharehold-
ers a bundle of dough. 
Finally one of the 1IT liquidators 
prevailed upon a Swiss bank to accept 
a $4.5 million deposit, I he bank man-
ager was perspiring, but he took the 
check, in the name of John Orr. Not 
myself as liquidator, but just John Orr, 
resident of Canada. We thought it a 
very good idea to have George Cihra 
as a signing officer, just in case some-
thing happened to me while flying 
back to Ontario. In fact, we thought it 
such a good idea that we laughed 
about it all the way home... for we 
wound up taking the same plane back 
to Toronto! 
Along about this time we began to 
be concerned about the taxation issue. 
Here we were repatriating money to 
Canada and putting it into certificates 
of deposit, and the interest would 
normally be taxable. The funds hadn't 
paid Canadian taxes as non-resident 
corporations, but that situation no 
longer applied. And the taxes to be 
paid would be fairly significant. We 
raised the question: was this fair to all 
those international investors, whose 
money was being repatriated at the 
behest of the Canadian government? 
We were frankly concerned, be-
cause this issue could be used against 
us by the ever-active Vesco group. It 
might be held as proof that we were 
trying to rip off the funds for the 
Canadian government. Eventually, we 
got a ruling from our government that 
the repatriated assets would not be 
subject to tax. That was another satis-
fying milestone for us. 
Sandwiched between these activi-
ties was our continuing interest in IOS 
headquarters at Ferney-Voltaire. It was 
obviously in the best interest of all the 
liquidators to sort out the shareholder 
records and keep the operation there 
running. So work moved along on that 
front (see accompanying story), and 
after some quibbling among the liqui-
dators concerning the apportionment 
of costs, we directed the London of-
fice of Touche Ross to lake charge of 
the work at Ferney. 
We survived in all this confusion 
with a slogan and a motto. The slogan 
was: "Whom do you trust?" I started 
out with the assumption that everyone 
I met was guilty until proven innocent. 
I figure if you go in looking for any-
thing that will mark this person as a liar 
or a cheat and you don't find anything, 
then you've got a basis for trusting him 
or her. 
Our motto was "A laugh a clay." 
Believe me, we couldn't have survived 
the frustration without it. Things that 
should have taken days took weeks, 
and issues that might have been re-
so lved in weeks dragged on for 
months. 
From about mid-1974 on, our work 
began to lake a more definite form. 
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We knew that the Bank of Montreal 
had about $106 million in fund money 
and that at some point further down 
the road all the fund liquidators would 
have to get together and work out an 
equitable distribution among us. We 
had worked up an agenda of items to 
examine one by one. For example, 
should anybody be sued? We an-
swered that one in the affirmative sev-
eral times, and many litigations are still 
pending. 
For every step we look, we could 
usually count on Vesco or LeBlanc to 
counter with a step of their own. It was 
like a game of chess on a global scale. 
We know that LeBlanc forms compa-
nies as readily as he lights a cigarette, 
and he can dispose of them just as 
easily. So we decided that his shell 
companies wouldn't bother us. As 
long as we knew where the money 
went in the first stages, where it went 
after that was in a way academic. 
The disappearance of $60 million 
(out of our estimated $107 million in 
recoverable assets) is more than aca-
demic, however. In 1972 Vesco fun-
neled this sum into a Costa Rican shell 
company called Inter-American Capi-
tal S.A. Fifty-four million was then 
transferred into Phoenix Financial, a 
Panamanian shell. Most of that found 
its way to Trident Bank, Ltd., which is a 
sub-depositor of Bahamas Common-
wealth Bank. BCB is now in liquida-
tion, but it look three years to reach 
that point. Meanwhile, Vesco claims: 
one, that he doesn't know anything 
about the theft of the money; and, 
two, that there isn't any left anyway. 
We keep reminding ourselves that 
we are after money, not people, but 
people and personalities have a lot to 
do with our degree of success. We've 
met Vesco a few times in the Bahamas 
and Costa Rica, and after the first 
meeting I had to go over my files on 
the man very carefully, to remind my-
self of the kind of person he is. He can 
be deceptively charming. 
Cornfeld, on the other hand, was 
surprisingly devoid of charm the two 
times we've spoken. Here was a man 
whom associates swore was the epit-
ome of charisma at his height, and 
now he is not even particularly like-
able. 
Our reactions to Vesco and Corn-
feld personally were not as important 
to our job as getting along with the 
liquidators of the other funds. IIT has 
two lawyers and a CPA from Luxem-
bourg, and Venture has a lawyer and 
an accountant from Curacao, George 
calls me the "elder statesman" of the 
group, since they chose me to act as 
chairman for our joint meetings. It 
hasn't always been easy to come to 
agreement, since we are from different 
backgrounds, with different personali-
ties, and we are responding to dissimi-
lar legal requirements. 
As North Americans, we tend to 
lake a businessman's approach to a 
liquidation: i.e., let's handle a problem 
in the most expeditious way. The Eu-
ropeans, however, take the position 
that they are court-appointed liquida-
tors, not businessmen. It they have to 
spend $100 to fight over $1, they'll do 
it. So there has been much to com-
promise in the years we have been 
working together. 
Another milestone was reached in 
September, 1976, when we made our 
first distribution of funds to Growth 
shareholders. They have since re-
ceived a second disbursement, and by 
and large the settlement of I O S 
Growth Fund is complete. Growth has 
always been the easier of the two 
funds to deal with. It was more recent, 
so records were more up to date. Its 
shareholders were virtually all Ger-
man, so the shareholders were much 
easier to track down. It was a smaller 
fund, so the assets were easier to trace 
and Vesco was less interested in si-
phoning them off. 
The first checks were mailed to FOF 
shareholders in July, 1977. The geo-
graphical dispersion of these investors 
was one reason for the delay (again, 
see accompanying story} but we also 
couldn't pay a nickel til! our suit against 
Bahamas Commonwealth Bank was 
settled. Meanwhile, the regulatory 
bodies were getting impatient, and we 
were getting letters from people who 
had heard about the liquidation and 
wanted to know where their money 
was. The other liquidators were un-
happy because the unfavorable pub-
licity was casting a bad light on all the 
funds. So we geared up our machinery 
at Ferney-Voltaire, and once the BCB 
settlement came in May, 1977 we were 
ready to roll. 
Speaking of publicity, that is another 
factor one doesn't tend to encounter 
in a "normal" liquidation. Cornfeld 
cultivated the press with his penchant 
for beautiful women and opulent sur-
roundings, and Vesco was no less 
eager to have his name spread, though 
he preferred the reputation of interna-
tional financier to that of international 
playboy. So anything to do with IDS 
was fair game for the press in any one 
of 150 countries boasting IOS inves-
tors. 
Reporters often tried to listen in on 
meetings of the Internationa! Regula-
tory Committee, but we tried to dis-
courage this. We didn't know for sure 
whom the reporters were represent-
ing; and as the committee itself grew, 
we didn't always know all of its 
members, either. I remember one 
meeting in Luxembourg when we had 
a group of some 60 people seated at 
an L-shaped table. I looked around the 
room and realized I didn't know half 
the people I was talking to—and what's 
more, the (able went around the 
corner so I couldn't even see the other 
half. 
Then, at another regulatory meeting, 
some reporters from the German 
publication Der Speigel tried to gain 
admittance. We refused the journalist, 
but agreed to let the photographer, a 
striking young woman, lake some pic-
tures. It turned out that she was not 
only a photographer but a reporter as 
well, and she laced into us with a less 
than flattering account of our activities 
in the next issue. (Among other things, 
one of the lesser delegates to that 
meeting was unwise enough to make a 
pass at her.) 
It is now our intention to make a 
second payment to FOF shareholders 
in November, 1979. We are actively 
involved in proceedings against seven 
cash depositories, and are monitoring 
closely some 38 claims relating to 
portfolio securities. 
To try to recover the missing $60 
million which disappeared into Inter-
American Capital S.A., we have taken a 
number of steps. We have brought 
lawsuit's against almost everyone in-
volved in the transactions which led to 
the disappearance of the funds. We 
have written several hundred letters to 
Panamanian and Costa Rican banks 
and regulatory authorities, asking for 
additional information. We're even 
open to discussing some sort of ar-
rangement with Mr. Vesco, but he has 
not heretofore indicated much will-
ingness to cooperate. 
On behalf of FOF shareholders, we 
were successful in protecting the 
assets of Global Natural Resources 
Properties, Ltd,, a corporation which 
was spun off from FOF in (970. Glob-
al's stock is not worthless, although 
FOF shareholders might have thought 
so at the lime. We went to court to 
bring Global under the control of a 
trustee, and we told FOF investors that 
it was in their interest to obtain and 
hold onto the shares of Global to 
which they were entitled. 
We've received many kind letters 
from shareholders grateful for the 
work we've done on their behalf. One 
fellow wrote to say he was framing his 
dividend check, rather than cashing it. 
But we have a problem about what to 
do with the money belonging to 
shareholders we've been unable to 
locate. It is in the bank earning interest, 
and at some point the court will have 
to resolve the question of who gets 
that interest. Should it go to the share-
holders who may turn up in the future? 
People who came forward and were 
paid at the outset might object, since it 
has cost more of their money to locate 
the laggards, the court will have to 
grapple with that issue, and also the 
question of what to do with the resid-
ual assets, once a final disbursement 
has been made. There is bound to be 
money left over from unc la imed 
shares, and probably it won't be 
enough to justify the expense of mail-
ing out to all known shareholders. The 
court might name a public trustee, or 
an agent; we just don't know right now. 
No other liquidation in history has 
involved so much time and money, so 
many creditors/investors (2S0,0()(J) 
spread over such a wide geographical 
area (the world). Some have called it 
the first truly effective international 
liquidation. Unfortunately, there is no 
precept of international law to prevent 
such a situation from happening again. 
The role of the International Regula-
tory Committee is a temporary one, 
and it has no supranational policing 
authority in any case. Cooperation on 
every level is essential in a liquidation 
of this d imens ion, and we got it 
through the committee, and through 
our own team. 
The Touche Ross office in Toronto 
has provided ten members of that 
team, and we've called upon Touche 
Ross officers in Montreal, New York, 
Houston, Denver, the Bahamas, Pan-
ama, London, France, and Tokyo. 
We've also been most fortunate in our 
choice of legal counsel. In addition, 
we've enjoyed the confidence of the 
Ontario court. So despite the aggrava-
tions and the setbacks, and the years 
invested, we can look at this job as a 
very special challenge. 
I personally will be close to retire-
ment age by the time the liquidation is 
wound up. But I'm looking ahead with 
anticipation. We were discussing this 
matter with Vesco one day and he said, 
"Why don't you fellows let go of this 
one and go home?" 
"No," we answered. "We'll get an-
other one to work on so that George 
and I will have something to do." 
And Vesco responded, " W h a t 
makes you think that I'm not working 
on another one right now?" 




In the glory days of IOS, Ferney-
Voltaire was an exciting place to work. 
But when disillusionment set in during 
the early 1970s, the headquarters staff 
shrank to a handful 
We realized that Ferney had to be in 
good working order, if we were to 
carry out our obligations as liquida-
tors. So we, and eventually the liqui-
dators of the four Dollar Funds collec-
tively, took over the operation at 
Ferney. The London office of Touche 
Ross provided us with management 
personnel. 
Our work consisted of four stages: 
— Validating and updating the share-
holder records we had, 
— Contacting the shareholders, 
— Processing claims as they came in, 
— Making payments. 
We started with a two-reel com-
puter tape confiscated from IOS 
headquarters by the Swiss police. We 
didn't know whether there might be 
bugs in the computer program, and 
we weren't sure if that tape was the 
definitive version of the IOS master 
file. So we conducted a computer 
audit. This was a two-step operation 
in which we both proved details on a 
sample of accounts going back 
through all available investment 
records and used records of computer 
transaction tapes, which we found at 
Ferney, to prove the validity of the 
computer process records. In other 
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words, we confirmed the current 
details on the master tape and then 
backtracked through the computer 
processing records to make sure our 
information cross-referenced to past 
investment records. We found an 
extremely high confidence ratio this 
way. 
At the same time, we were develop-
ing a completely new set of data 
updating and managing information 
for the computer program. The IOS 
master tape was quite non-standard 
and required use of a low-level com-
puter language. So we rewrote the 
program from scratch to bring the 
program to a more standard, sophisti-
cated, and manageable form. 
Then we set up standards for the 
processing of claims. These standards 
had to be worked out by the four 
funds' liquidators, drawn up and sub-
mitted to courts in Ontario, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands Antilles 
for approval. To meet everyone's 
requirements, we wound up building 
a Rolls Royce that me! very stringent 
specifications. Everything had to be 
worked out and agreed upon—the 
drawing up of Confirmations of State-
ments of Account (CSAs), the amount 
of proof needed and for what value of 
account, the definition of high- and 
low-value accounts, signature guaran-
ty, death claims, divorces, changes of 
name, minors reaching adulthood. As 
an adjunct, we had to train people to 
carry out our clerical testing 
procedures. 
We completed the above by March, 
1975, and the following month we 
began to mail out our statements of 
account for all the Dollar Funds, starl-
ing with Growth. By August we had 
completed all 250,001) mailings. In the 
first week, after a mailing of 60,000, 
we had 5,000 letters returned because 
of incorrect address. We were initially 
discouraged, but our overall first-time 
response was 40 percent. 
We achieved this level of 100,000 
replies by October (975. We waited 
that long for our "cutoff point," 
because we were mailing to practical-
ly every country in the world, many 
with inefficient mailing systems. More-
over, we were mailing in only four lan-
guages (English, French, Spanish and 
German), and many more tongues 
were represented among the fund-
holders. In addition, IOS customers 
tended to be highly mobile people 
who were often away from their 
home addresses. 
Since we were obliged to make 
every possible effort to contact share-
holders, we then remailed the CSAs, 
with a new letter, to the non-respon-
dents. We got replies from another 
25,000 this way. 
Bui 50 percenl were still missing. So 
we set up a procedure to trace them, 
using both internal and external docu-
mentation. We also picked up clues 
from the shareholders' original appli-
cation forms, especially for accounts 
in which the address had been bad to 
start with. We ran ads in various news-
papers, advising IOS shareholders thai 
a disbursement of assets was in the 
offing. Finally, we ran a third and final 
mailing. 
Our track record for Growth Fund is 
satisfying; we have located 96 percent 
of its shareholders by number and 99 
percent by value of shares owned. For 
Fund of Funds, we have fared less 
well. We finally tracked down 78 per-
cent of its shareholders by number, 
but this represented 93 percent by 
value and determined our cutoff 
point. We are no longer actively look-
ing for shareholders. 
We anticipated that there might be 
problems of manipulation and control 
as the CSAs were returned. In one 
week, at our peak, we had 15,000 let-
ters come in. So we laid down our 
processing procedures most carefully. 
All claims were double-checked. If a 
claim was for over $500, the share-
holder's signature had to be guaran-
teed in some way. Also, we checked 
each signature on the CSA against the 
client's application signature. This was 
a hand job, one of the few facets of 
the operation we could not assign to 
the computer. Plus, we had a sample 
check of work by supervisors and a 
separate sample check by audit. Our 
staff at Ferney grew from 6 in May, 
1975, to some 170 at our peak in Sep-
tember, 1976. 
When we reached the stage of 
making payments, we had further 
headaches. We looked worldwide for 
a bank to make the payments, and 
had very few offers. We needed a 
bank with credibility, financial 
wherewithal, considerable assets (all 
the checks had to be dated and 
mailed the same day, since the Ger-
man fund holders were sensitive to the 
fluctuations of the Deutschmark), and 
computer expertise. 
Toronto Dominion Bank was our 
final choice. All our payment instruc-
tions to them are handled by com-
puter, and their notification to us of 
payment is done likewise. We even 
have a subsidiary computer system to 
keep track of what happens to each 
check after mailing. 
Since May, 1978, it has no longer 
been advantageous for FOF and 
Growth to operate from Ferney. Our 
computer tapes are in Ontario and 
our records must end up here anyway, 
since the court will eventually take 
over any unfinished aspects of the liq-
uidation. The other two Dollar Funds 
are wrapping up their operations at 
Ferney as well, though for the 
moment the IOS archives remain there. 
The archives remain, as does one 
other momento of the Cornfeld days 
of glory—a huge hole which was to 
have been the foundation for a mag-
nificent building to house the IOS 
empire. & 
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